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Introduction 
Up Against the Fallen Wall: 
The Crisis of Social Partnership 
in Unified Germany 
Lowell Turner 
It IS commonplace for both eastern and western Germans to 
remark, not always in jest and often with bitterness, that they were better 
off before the Berlin Wall came down. Westerners resent the high economic 
costs of unification, which have translated into higher taxes and lower 
paychecks to finance an enormous resource transfer from West to East 
(about $100 billion per year since unification in 1990). Easterners resent 
the collapse of their economy, mass unemployment in a formerly full em-
ployment society, the stripping away of social benefits ranging from free 
child care to government-subsidized vacation homes, and the occupation of 
their territory by Western business, labor, and government officials. 
These complaints are symptomatic of the contemporary crisis of social 
partnership in unified Germany. And indeed it is quite clear that the German 
social market economy is under extraordinary pressure from a number of 
directions. Competition on the global market is becoming more and more 
intense; European economic integration continues to demand social, politi-
cal, and economic concessions that Germany cannot easily afford. Added 
to these are the immediate and protracted pressures of German unification. 
Yet the fate of the German model of economic and social regulation is 
important far beyond the new national borders: on it depends not only the 
relative success of German exports in world markets but also the prospects 
for democratic stability here at the center of the new, post-cold war Europe 
and the very future of social democracy.1 
1. This is not to say that West Germany was ever as fully social-democratic as other, smaller 
countries such as Sweden. The interplay between the major postwar political parties blended 
I 
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This book addresses two central and related sets of questions. First, what 
type of political economy is emerging in unified Germany? How "West 
German" is it? Is Germany permanently polarized into East and West or 
converging on a single, integrated political economy? To what extent is the 
"coordinated market economy" (Soskice 1991) becoming less, or differ-
ently, coordinated? The answers to these questions will affect the outcomes 
of issues ranging from policy and politics to production organization. 
Second, what has happened to the famous German "social partnership" 
since unification? Do the employer offensives of 1993-1996 in the pattern-
setting metal and electronics industries, and in other industries as well, 
indicate a serious hollowing out or simply a readjustment of the social 
partnership? What has happened to employer associations and unions since 
German unification? What will happen to them in the near future? Can 
German industry hold its own in increasingly competitive world markets 
with its social partnership relations intact, or is this an outdated and expen-
sive model of the past? Can the social partnership survive decentralization 
and lean production, or will they undermine and eventually dissolve it? 
The articles in this collection focus on the conditions for institutional 
adaptation in new market circumstances. In the "new world disorder" of 
an increasingly globalized economy, what happens to the German political 
economy will have wide repercussions for the pace and shape of economic 
development throughout Europe. The questions addressed above illuminate 
broader ones: Will any sort of social market capitalism persist in Germany 
(and other parts of Europe) as an alternative to the U.S. and Japanese 
variants of capitalism? Or are we all in time headed down the same road of 
deregulation, lean production, and union decline? Is Germany now falling 
apart, as some observers claim, a victim of high costs and/or unification, or 
are there good prospects for future economic, political, and social success? 
What does the future hold for social democracy in Germany, Europe, and 
elsewhere? 
On the front lines of contemporary social science research into rapidly 
changing world events, such questions rarely have "correct answers." 
Rather, they usually provoke ongoing and sometimes heated debate based 
on contrasting empirical evidence and analytical approaches. In this book, 
therefore, we present not one answer to each of these questions but rather 
important elements of social democracy, Christian democracy, and liberalism in the making of 
economic and social policy as well as political and economic institutions. But with its strong 
unions, comprehensive collective bargaining, and other arrangements for labor-inclusive nego-
tiation throughout the political economy and with its expansive welfare state, West Germany 
—and unified Germany today—has certainly been the large industrial society that most closely 
approximates a social-democratic model. 
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a variety of well-argued answers from different perspectives. In the presen-
tation of diverse opinions, our hope is both to offer the truth—none of us in 
this uncertain world can be absolutely certain that our own well-researched 
findings and persuasively argued analyses are correct, yet somewhere in this 
diversity the truth does lie—and to stimulate the reader's own critical think-
ing about changing global markets and the prospects for socially responsible 
regulation. 
THE GERMAN MODEL 
This book can only introduce the contemporary debates; it is beyond our 
scope to spell out in great detail how the German economy works and how 
its social partnership orientation distinguishes it from other variants of 
capitalism found in Japan, the United States, and elsewhere. Yet the careful 
reader will travel behind the scenes and into the workings of social partner-
ship capitalism in a number of areas, from economic policy, to industrial 
relations, to vocational training. Those seeking a more schematic and de-
tailed presentation of the organization of the German economy should con-
sult other sources.2 To understand the arguments presented in this book, a 
thumbnail sketch of the German model should suffice. 
Germans refer to theirs as a "social market" economy. By this, they mean 
an economy organized around market principles such as supply and de-
mand and free trade, yet subject to extensive social regulation. The empha-
sis on market principles means, for example, that the Federal Republic and 
its major interest groups have throughout the postwar period supported 
expanding free trade (and indeed the German economy is significantly de-
pendent on exports) and European economic integration. In addition, mon-
etary policy is regulated by a strong and independent central bank, 
committed at all costs to keeping inflation low in order to ensure the 
strength and stability of the currency with which market exchanges are 
transacted. The emphasis on social regulation is intended to ensure that the 
impersonal workings of markets do not interfere with or undermine basic 
social needs, ranging from adequate income and health care, to organized 
representation in the workplace, to comprehensive vocational training. So-
cial regulation includes both a safety net and broader social benefits (includ-
2. See, for example, Streeck 1984, Berghahn and Karsten 1987, Katzenstein 1989, Thelen 
1991, and Wever 1995. For a concise and useful history of Germany from World War II 
through unification, see H. Turner 1992. On the problems and processes of German unifica-
tion, see Huelshoff, Markovits, and Reich 1993; Hancock and Welsh 1994; and Goodhart 
1994. For comparative analyses that contrast German economic organization to that found in 
the United States and other countries, see Hart 1992, Soskice 1990, L. Turner 1991, and 
Wever 1995. 
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ing, for example, health care for all and free university education for all 
who qualify). Part and parcel of social regulation is the concept of social 
partnership: negotiated agreements between strong and well-organized em-
ployer associations and labor unions throughout the political economy, 
from wage bargaining, to vocational training, to regularized input into 
economic policymaking. 
This collection emphasizes the social partnership: the actors and institu-
tional relationships that make the German economy a social market and 
distinguish it fundamentally from other types of capitalism.3 Most employ-
ers in Germany belong to powerful employer associations organized by 
industrial sector; around one-third of German employees belong to indepen-
dent labor unions (most of which are also organized by industrial sector).4 
More telling than membership levels is the fact that for most employees 
in the private sector, basic pay levels and working conditions are set in 
comprehensive collective bargaining agreements between employer asso-
ciations and industrial unions (Jacobi, Keller, and Muller-Jentsch 1992, 
236-38).5 
In addition to collective bargaining, generally negotiated outside the firm 
for entire sectors and regions, the German "dual system" of industrial rela-
tions offers a second basic pillar of representation for employees: codetermi-
nation at the firm level. German law provides for elected workforce 
representation both on the supervisory boards of firms with five hundred or 
more employees and in the works councils for each workplace with five or 
more employees. In the latter case in particular, works councillors elected 
by the entire workforce, blue collar and white, have regularized and ongo-
ing rights to information concerning and consultation and participation in 
management decision-making processes. Since in most cases works council-
lors as well as elected supervisory board members are also members of 
one of the sixteen dominant industrial unions, codetermination provides 
an additional firm-based level of union influence and ongoing labor-
3. See Hart 1992 for a useful description of alternative ways of organizing market econo-
mies, in Britain, France, Germany, the United States, and Japan. 
4. Figures vary according to how calculations are made. Typical figures, stable for most of 
the postwar period, show union membership density ranging around 35 percent. See, for 
example, Jacobi, Keller, and Muller-Jentsch 1992, 232. 
5. Exact numbers are difficult to pin down. Typically cited private sector figures (for 1989 
to 1996) range around 80 percent employer association coverage (meaning that 80 percent of 
all employees work at firms belonging to an employers association) in western Germany and 
around 50 percent in eastern Germany (where association presence is still quite new). Figures 
gathered by Stephen Silvia from Gesamtmetall for the metal and electronics industries indicate 
somewhat lower—and declining—rates of coverage: 74.5 percent of West German employees 
were covered by comprehensive collective bargaining in 1984, compared to 64.2 percent in 
1993. 
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management negotiation. In practice, personnel decisions in such areas as 
transfers, promotions, hiring and firing, work reorganization, working 
hours, and overtime are not made without the consent of the elected works 
council.6 
These private-sector processes are mirrored in the public sector, where 
"personnel councils" play the role of works councils and basic pay and 
working conditions are set in negotiations between strong unions and cor-
responding government ministries. 
If comprehensive collective bargaining and codetermination are the cor-
nerstones of social partnership in Germany, negotiation and collaboration 
among organized business and labor also permeate both the human infra-
structure of the economy and the processes of economic and social poli-
cymaking at the local, state, and federal levels. The much admired and 
extensive German system of vocational training (in which two-thirds of 
young Germans receive skills training in multiyear apprenticeships, fol-
lowed by continuing opportunities for advanced training), for example, is 
everywhere overseen and actively participated in by both employer associa-
tions and labor unions. And the "social partners" are actively consulted in 
government policymaking, often quietly and behind the scenes but some-
times formally and with great public fanfare, as in 1992-93 "Solidarity 
Pact" negotiations that set the framework for key economic policy decisions 
regarding the new states of eastern Germany. 
In these and other ways, well-organized and officially recognized social 
partners—business and labor—establish rules and negotiate important 
components of the framework in which the German market economy 
operates. 
THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
The social market model, referred to here as "social partnership capital-
ism" to indicate the active and central role of organized business and labor, 
had great success throughout the lifespan of West Germany (1949-1990). 
Impressive and consistently strong economic performance unfolded over 
four decades in a society characterized by strong labor and social standards, 
including high wages and benefits, low income polarization (compared to 
6. This is especially true for firms with one hundred or more employees, virtually all of 
which have elected works councils. Many smaller firms do not have works councils (although 
they are mandated by law), since employee initiative is required to establish an election com-
mittee to get the process started. Since there are no penalties for not having a works council, 
smaller firms often lack works councils for one or both of the following reasons: the employees 
lack the interest or initiative to establish one, or the employer has discouraged them from 
exercising their rights. 
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other large industrial societies), and strong mechanisms for workforce rep-
resentation. The authors represented in this book are unanimous in their 
admiration of key elements of the German model. They diverge in their 
assessments of the adaptation and resilience of the model in the face of 
dramatic new challenges in the 1990s. 
When in the wake of unification the German economy plunged into a 
deep recession in 1992-1993, voices were raised on both sides of the Atlan-
tic to argue that German social partnership was an expensive relic of a 
welfare-state past that could no longer solve the problems of an increasingly 
competitive global marketplace. In its emphasis on expanded vocational 
training, labor-management partnership, and a more activist government 
economic policy, the Clinton administration, and in particular Secretary of 
Labor Robert Reich, was criticized from the Right as a proponent of the 
German model just as this model headed into decline.7 Even admirers of 
German social partnership wondered if negotiated decision making, strong 
labor and social standards, entrenched patterns of labor-management col-
laboration, and strong trade unionism in an era of international union 
decline could survive in the new post-cold war global economy. 
In 1990 the stakes were raised dramatically. To West Germany's stable 
social market economy—population 60 million—was added overnight a 
large new chunk of territory, the former East Germany, with a population 
of 16 million. In the face of currency union on July 1, 1990, and political 
unification on October 3, 1990, both the eastern economy and accompa-
nying institutions such as public ownership structures and communist-led 
trade unions collapsed. Western "social partners" were confronted quite 
suddenly with a vacuum of ownership and representation requiring major 
organizational efforts. Although both unions and employer associations 
quickly established a presence in the East and began to negotiate compre-
hensive collective bargaining agreements, more fundamental questions re-
mained: Could these new actors and institutions transferred from the West 
sink roots deep enough to make social partnership work in the new federal 
states—and so in unified Germany as a whole? Would incoming westerners 
adapt or impose their model in the East? Could economic growth take off 
in the East, to bring this part of the country and its imported institutions 
up to western levels, to make unification a reality? Or would the East 
remain a less developed area, weak in both economic capacity and represen-
tation, where individual employers could set lower labor and social stan-
dards (as U.S. employers have done in the American South) that in time 
would undermine the social partnership back in the West? For a host of 
7. See, for example, David Gitlitz and Lawrence Kudlow, "The Reich Reich," National 
Review, July n , 1994, pp. 44ff. 
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reasons, well-placed scholars of German industrial relations predicted pessi-
mistic and perhaps ultimately disastrous scenarios for both unions and 
employer associations in the new Eastern states.8 
As if life-and-death challenges posed by unification were not enough, two 
other major challenges came into full view in the early 1990s. First, continu-
ing European integration lent credibility to the threat that German employ-
ers would relocate their firms and factories to much cheaper locations in 
southern and eastern Europe. The threat of capital flight or "social dump-
ing" (expressed in the 1990s as a loud and public debate over the viability 
of Standort Deutschland, Germany as a production location) threatened to 
raise employer bargaining power at the expense of unions', weaken national 
institutions of regulation, and thereby destabilize the social partnership (see, 
for example, Mosley 1990 and Streeck 1991). And second, intensified 
global trade competition and especially the development of low-cost, high-
quality Japanese production methods exposed problematic German rigidi-
ties in both cost and production organization (see, for example, Kern and 
Sabel 1990 and Gary Herrigel's chapter in this volume). German industry 
appeared by the early 1990s to require a major reorganization of work, a 
daunting task for a rather stable and slow-to-change social partnership. 
THE DEBATES 
The debates in this collection concern both the actual responses of the 
social partners to these challenges and the prospects for adaptation and 
future success. Extreme views are excluded: both the now-discredited 
"blooming landscape" perspective, which posits a largely seamless transfer 
of western institutions to the East and continuing rapid adjustment of Ger-
man industry to new European and global challenges, and the hopelessly 
pessimistic "iron-cage" perspective, which discounts actor strategies and 
sees the German social partnership as trapped by impersonal forces of 
history. 
Michael Fichter, Gary Herrigel, and Stephen Silvia all emphasize the crisis 
faced by social partnership and its current erosion. Fichter emphasizes pro-
longed East-West tension within the labor unions and the failure of trans-
planted western institutions to take root in eastern soil. Herrigel highlights 
western rigidities in work organization, on the part of managers and skilled 
workers, that interfere with a necessary reorganization of German industry 
to match the output of Japanese-inspired lean production. Silvia calls atten-
tion to the increasing bifurcation of the contemporary German labor mar-
8. On employer associations, see Wiesenthal, Ettl, and Bialas 1992. For unions, see Armin-
geon 1991 and Mahnkopf 1991 and 1993. 
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ket, which has begun to affect formerly insulated groups such as skilled 
blue-collar workers, pointing in the direction of an American-style polar-
ization that could well confine the social partnership to a shrinking elite 
core. 
On the more optimistic side, Peter Auer, Lowell Turner, Douglas Webber, 
and Kirsten Wever emphasize the capacity for continuing negotiated prob-
lem solving within the basic social partnership. Auer outlines the basic 
stability of German social partnership, and especially codetermination, as 
indicated by bargaining outcomes of 1993-95, while nonetheless calling 
attention to the millions of unemployed, who are not part of the system and 
need to be included. Turner points to the dramatic and unexpected strike 
victory of IG Metall in eastern Germany in 1993 and backs up his assess-
ment of the relative success of social partnership with plant-level case stud-
ies. Webber presents broad political evidence, such as the Solidarity Pact 
negotiations of 1992-93, to argue that pressures of unification have actu-
ally promoted a resurgence of key elements of the German model, such as 
peak-level "corporatist" bargaining between organized business and labor. 
And Wever, calling attention as Herrigel does to necessary decentralization 
and reform within German firms, nonetheless argues that entrenched pat-
terns of negotiation and compromise make successful renegotiation within 
the firm possible. 
Other, perhaps wiser voices place less emphasis on either optimistic or 
pessimistic assessment, examining instead the contingencies present in key 
areas of economic policy. Chris Allen examines unification-era policy fail-
ures and the great danger inherent in what he poetically terms the "siren 
song of deregulation." Matthias Knuth explains the paradox of social peace 
in circumstances of massive economic dislocation in eastern Germany as a 
product of unprecedentedly active labor-market policy efforts, including 
important (and union-inspired) innovations such as the employment and 
training company (ETC). And finally, Richard Locke and Wade Jacoby 
examine the post-unification development of vocational training systems in 
eastern Germany, comparing Leipzig and Chemnitz to explain the successes 
and failures of institutional transfer as products of the vitality of local 
institutions and networks of civil society. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR A THEORY OF CHANGE 
Three variables emerge as most relevant in the sometimes contrasting 
analyses presented in this book: global competition and economic restruc-
turing (the environment); existing institutions (structure); and actor strategy 
(agency). For those who emphasize the crisis, all three are important: global 
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market competition drives change, which is inhibited by institutional rigid-
ity and aggravated by an employer offensive against the rigidities within 
German social partnership. For those who emphasize adaptation of the 
German model in difficult circumstances, global markets and the employer 
offensive drive change while flexible institutions and actor strategies (espe-
cially union strategy) shape viable adaptation. 
The real differences then are both empirical and theoretical and concern 
mainly structure and agency—since we all agree about the severity of envi-
ronmental challenges, from global competition and European integration 
to German unification. The authors concur that institutions are important, 
but differ considerably over just how flexible or rigid, how capable of 
reform, these contemporary German institutions are. To what extent are 
Germans today trapped in once successful institutions (and corresponding 
identities, as Herrigel argues) that are no longer up to the new tasks faced, 
or capable of adequate and rapid reform—a German version, perhaps, of 
the "British disease"? To what extent can conscious actors shape or adapt 
the given institutions to solve major new problems? How important are 
innovative union strategies—or are the actors trapped by environmental 
and institutional constraints? 
Finally, if strategy matters, then what kind is most important? Each au-
thor emphasizes a different area, and in so doing stakes a claim for primary 
theoretical relevance. Fichter, Herrigel, Silvia, and Wever emphasize internal 
organizational reform, pointing both to the constraints and opportunities 
in given institutions and to potential actor strategies to reform the institu-
tions in the face of new challenges. Knuth, Turner, and Webber, by contrast, 
emphasize outward-directed strategy, especially on the part of unions and 
government, to adapt and reform institutions, policies, and bargaining 
relationships. 
The overarching theme of this volume is conflict and negotiation—a 
fitting theme for a book on social partnership. Since 1989, the German 
model has found itself under great pressure; change or at least the necessity 
of change is driven by dramatic circumstances in the world arena. Existing 
institutions of the Federal Republic, now transferred to the new states of 
eastern Germany as well, matter a great deal for German capacities to 
manage the crisis—and as various authors argue here from different view-
points, make some outcomes more likely than others. Yet within given 
institutional constraints, actors in business, labor, and government promote 
innovative or traditional strategies, which in turn collide with the strategies 
of other actors. In the end, the outcomes of conflict and negotiation between 
actors will provide at least the immediate cause for the relative success or 
failure of both policy innovation and institutional reform. 
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